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ETHIO-ERITREAN POST-SECESSION HOSTILITY: LESSONS FOR SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

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The central focus of this paper is on drawing lessons for Sudan and South Sudan after examining the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession hostility. Through examining various documents qualitatively and ascertaining the view of key informants, the study has come up with the following findings. First, the post-secession Sudan and South Sudan destabilization and proxy engagement need to be repudiated since it complicates the normalization process and widen the existing mistrust and animosity. Second, the culture of militarism needs to be replaced by a new political and diplomatic approach. Third, the negative implications of unaccountable and authoritarian rule should to be overcome and replaced by a democratic system of governance where the power of the elite is limited, the voice of the public heard and the rights of civil-political organizations guaranteed. Fourth, the forceful and abusive deportations of nationals of each other must come to an end since it threatened bilateral relations and people to people cordiality. Fifth, the issue of political will and compromise is also fundamental to Sudan and South Sudan to solve various unresolved issues including border disputes. Institutionalization of their relations and implementation of the agreements in good faith is the other compelling lesson to be drawn thereof by the Sudan and South Sudan.

Key words: Secession, Normalization, Lesson, Hostility, Peace, Conflict, War.

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INTRODUCTION

Historical Overviews on Ethiopia-Eritrea and Sudan-South Sudan Relations

Eritrea was an integral part of Ethiopia until it was brought under Italian control in 1890 (Girma, 1993; Kidist, 2011; Tekeste, 1997). However, the Italian East African colony was ended in 1941 and Eritrea became a

mandate territory of British until 1952 (Andargachew, 1993; Girma, 1993; Kidist, 2011). The subsequent diplomatic efforts of the Imperial Government to the United Nations (UN) federated Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952. However, the dissolution of the federation promoted the Eritrean armed insurgency for independence (Girma, 1993; Mesfin, 1990). The war for

independence was first initiated by Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and later the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) both of which were the prominent liberation movements in Eritrea (Tekeste, 1997). The activities of the liberation movements also persisted after the downfall of monarchical rule and the coming to power of the military regime. In collaboration with Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the EPLF facilitated the dissolution of the military government in 1991 (Healy and Plaut, 2007).

The defeat of the military regime, *Derg*, and the coming to power of the EPRDF witnessed a remarkable development on the final fate of Eritrea as a result of which, Eritrea became independent following the 1993 Referendum. In the initial years of independence, Ethiopia and Eritrea established close relationship in economic, security, political and social fields (ICG, 2003; Kidist, 2011; Tekeste, 1997). They began formal state-to-state relations by signing a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 13 July 1993 (Kidist, 2011). However, such alliance and cordial relations did not last long since it was not free from suspicions and mistrusts, and in 1998 the two years border war flared up around the Badme area.

Following Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia, South Sudan is the second case of a successful secession in postcolonial Africa. South Sudan and Eritrea gained sovereignty with the consent of their former 'motherland', though after a long and violent struggle. Sudan and South Sudan faced a destructive armed struggle and civil wars since their formal independence from British colonialism (Kimenyi, 2012). The discontent in the process of decolonization and the forced Islamisation done by the Muslim North brought the civil war in Sudan from 1955 to 1772 (Rolandsen, 2005; Varma, 2011).

On 27 February 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was signed between South Sudan Liberation Movement (popularly known as *Anyanya*) and the central government of Sudan (Rolandsen, 2005). The Addis Ababa Agreement made Southern Sudan as an autonomous region with its own parliament and a High Executive Council (Ibid). However, violation of certain provisions of the Addis Ababa Accord by the Sudanese regime instigated the Southern rebel forces to realign and restart the war, which led to the eruption of a Second Civil War (Rolandsen, 2005; Varma, 2011). The Second Civil War, in which an estimated 1.5 million people died, began in 1983 and ended only in 2005 with the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Varma, 2011).

CPA was concluded granting self-government to the South under the leadership of Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) and providing for holding a Referendum to be held in 2011 on the region's future status. CPA was perceived as an opportunity to restore trust in the broken relationships between North and South Sudan. Some of the key factors that fueled the conflict

were resolved, but the issue of national identity was not. South Sudan formally declared its independence in July 2011 after 98.8% of its people voted for independence in the Referendum and now became Africa's 54th state (Seri-Hersch, 2013).

As noted by Kimenyi (2012), the post-Referendum relations between the two Sudans are on a downward trend; one that could easily result in escalation of war. Tensions over resources as well as borders heightened, which further create a complexity on the relationship and reconciliation process (Varma, 2011).

Thus, the overall focus of the study is to examine the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession hostility with the view to draw lessons that South Sudan and Sudan can learn from the experience of Ethiopia and Eritrea in the process of harmonizing their relationships and alleviating differences.

The Sudan-South Sudan Conflict and the Lessons to be drawn from the Ethio-Eritrean Post-Secession Experience

South Sudan formally declared its independence in July 2011 after the majority of its eligible voters decided in favor of independence. Despite the formal separation, the present relations between Sudan and South Sudan are tense and the two countries contested over a range of unresolved issues. Among others, the two Sudans entered into protracted disagreement on the issues of border, citizenship and financial arrangements, including those pertaining to revenues from the sale of South Sudanese oil that transit through Sudan for export. The alleged engagements of the two countries in supporting rebels of each other also bedeviled their relations. Taking into consideration the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience, the following lessons are drawn thereof by Sudan and South Sudan that could help them in the process of normalizing their relations.

The Border Disputes

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended over two decades of the Civil War called for the demarcation of the borders of Sudan and South Sudan within six months (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). Pursuant to the Presidential Decree of September 2005, a Technical Border Committee (TBC) was established to demarcate the boundary between Sudan and South Sudan based on the 1956 map (ICG, 2010). The TBC was expected to submit its finding to the Presidency by identifying areas that could not be agreed upon. While the TBC agreed on most of the boundaries, a handful of the areas remained contested (Ibid). The areas contested by the two countries cover the northern-most border running from Upper Nile to the White Nile State, the oil fields of Unity State and the Southern Kordofan, the area

that forms the western-most dividing line between Bahr-el-Ghazal and Southern Darfur as well as the northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and south Darfur (ICG, 2010; Johnson, 2010). Hence, the border between the two Sudans was neither fully delimited nor demarcated during the interim period.

Remarkable border disputes between Sudan and South Sudan witnessed following the independence of the latter (Kimenyi, 2012). Divergent claims with respect to territorial issues ensued and open armed clashes occurred over Abyei, Southern Kordofan (which contains the disputed Heglig oil field) and Blue Nile regions (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2013). In the hope of crushing the insurgents within its territory, the Sudanese government started a new campaign of attacking the rebels around its southern part specifically in South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). Subsequently, the Sudanese air force crossed the border of South Sudan and entered Unity state, considering this area as the haven for dissident groups (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2013). Sudan's infiltration into the territory of South Sudan reflects the act of hostility against the government of South Sudan (Ibid), which also took a retaliatory measure and entered into the territories of Sudan notably the town of Heglig (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012; Hsiao, 2012). Open armed clashes also took place in another contested territory, Abyei (For more details see section 4.2.). Due to such provocative military maneuvers, South Sudanese and Sudan forces were heavily deployed.

After months of bloodshed and tension, Sudan and South Sudan agreed to maintain a safe border through which different socio-economic activities can be carried out easily. Greater emphasis was given to the swift demarcation of shared borders as well as establishment of Integrated Border Management approaches. The agreement also called for the formation of a Joint Demarcation Committee and Technical Team with the mandate to supervise the demarcation process and provide technical assistance during the actual demarcation process respectively. However, according to Omer Salih Abubakr, demarcation of the border is not yet finalized even if the two countries agreed on it critically.¹

The border between Ethiopia and Eritrea remained un-demarcated at the time of the independence of the latter. It was described as not-urgent issue, which later forced the two countries to pay heavy cost. The un-demarcated border was used as a pretext for the outbreak of the brutal and devastating war that cost the lives of thousands of peoples from both sides. Millions of dollars were also expended for the procurement and acquisition of sophisticated weapons. The issue of border is still very

contentious despite the ruling of the EEBC (Ethiopia and Eritrea Boundary Commission) and the un-demarcated border is becoming a state of frozen hostility thereby exposing peoples living along the common borders to different hardships (Plaut, 2005/2006).

The un-demarcated border between Sudan and South Sudan is quite worrying as well, given the heavy reliance of both states on oil revenues coming from border areas. As Kimenyi (2012) stated, much of the known oil deposits of the two Sudans located along the common border. Not only oil, the disputed areas between the two countries are rich in other minerals including the arable land itself (Ibid). Demarcation of border thus becomes the question of determining who have the authority over a certain resources located in different colliders. The presence of huge natural resources along the common frontiers can create the possibility of forceful grabbing of fields that do not officially belong to them. Though the government of Sudan denied (Sudan Tribune, 9 April 2014), South Sudan accused the unusual movement and incursion of the Sudanese army along the border areas (Sudan Tribune, 8 April 2014). The Ethio-Eritrean intimate relations were partly shuttered by the skirmishes and provocative military maneuvers that took place around border areas. Sudan and South Sudan, therefore, shall curtail such sorts of provocative moves and military adventurism along the common boundaries so as to harmonize their relations. In this regard, Berouk strongly contends that mutual recognition and respect of the shared borders is decisive for these two countries to live in peace.²

As the saying goes "good fences make good neighbors" (Kimenyi, 2012: 7), mistrust and anxiety and insecurity can be mitigated as far as the two countries fully operationalize and demarcate their borders. In this regard, Esayas³ (2014) and Berouk (2014) argued that Sudan and South Sudan can come out of the prevailing border deadlocks when there is political will and readiness to compromise for anything that must be compromised (see Rolandsen, *et al.*, 2012). According to Abebe, demarcation of borders and normalization of the Ethio-Eritrean relations remain unresolved due to the absence of "political will" and the uncompromising stances of the two governments.⁴ It is quit challenging to curtail border deadlocks and normalize relations without the willingness and commitments of the parties to the conflict. It is also obvious that demarcation of the borders

¹ Interview with Omer Salih Abubakr, Sudanese Ambassador to Ethiopia, 1 April 2014

² Interview with Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher at Institute for Security Studies, 28 February 2014

³ Interview with Esayas Girmay, a Diplomat at Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 25 February 2014.

⁴ Interview with Abebe Muluneh, Head of IGAD Security Sector Program, 4 April 2014

may not satisfy the interests of the two Sudans on equal basis. In the light of this, the two Sudans are forced to adopt and follow compromise in any forthcoming negotiations with regard to border demarcation and normalization process. The Ethio-Eritrean experience further reveals that ascertaining the ideas and opinions of peoples living along the disputed border areas would be of paramount importance to solve the border problems. According to Kalewongel (2008), the overall peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea was unable to bring an end to the conflict in general and the border dispute in particular due to the exclusion of local peoples living along the disputed areas from the peace deal. The EEBC failed to ascertain the ideas of local peoples before passing its ruling thereby leading to the occurrence of the flawed decisions. In this regard, the two Sudans shall better consult and involve local peoples during the negotiation and the signing of agreements. The rationale here is that implementation of the deals become easy when it is conducted involving the public in general and local peoples living in the disputed territory in particular. Besides, ascertaining the ideas of local peoples is also essential to avoid the unnecessary divisions of homesteads and relapse of territories that do not belong to the other.

Analysts, on their part, argued that demarcation of borders between Sudan and South Sudan should be better "soft", which allows traders, pastoralists and migrant workers to move easily and form socio-economic and cultural linkages (Musso, 2011; ICG, 2010). The September 2012 Border Accord between the two Sudans also emphasized the establishment of such kind of arrangement. According to Omer Salih Abubakr (2014), peoples from both sides shared pasture and water sources for centuries and formed socio-cultural linkages. Thus, the establishment of "soft" borders can benefit communities living on both sides of the border whose potential to avert local disputes is high.

Centrality of the Abyei Dispute

Abyei straddles the border between Sudan and South Sudan. It is a small territory permanently settled by the Ngok-Dinka, a subset of South Sudan's largest ethnic group (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). The nomadic Misseriya of Sudan also extensively used the land and water sources in Abyei for seasonal grazing and herding of cattle. It is this mixed use of the land that prompted the transfer of Abyei to Kordofan in 1905 (Ibid). The Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka co-existed in Abyei for centuries and their relations were smooth (Jensen and Fick, 2009; Johnson, 2010). However, relations between these groups were severed following the independence of Sudan from Anglo-Egyptian rule (Ibid). The discovery of oil in Abyei exacerbated disputes between the Sudan and

South Sudan the spillover effect of which impacted the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka cordiality.

Though the CPA called for the demarcation of the Abyei boundaries before the end of the interim period, consensus was not reached between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan. As per the requirements of the CPA, the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) passed its decision and based on the decision of the Commission the Heglig and Bamboo oil fields fell within Abyei (ICG, 2010). The government of Sudan rejected this decision of the Commission noting that the Commission placed a significant portion of its oil reserves in the disputed territory-Abyei (ICG, 2010; Jensen and Fick, 2009; Winter and Prendergast, 2008). As a result of such discord, the case was then presented to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2009, which redefined the Abyei area and placed Heglig and Bamboo fields outside of Abyei (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012; ICG, 2010). The government of Sudan once again opposed the ruling of the PCA resulting from its quest to control the remaining oil reserves of Abyei and the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline that crosses this area (ICG, 2010; Johnson, 2010). Implementation of the decision of the PCA, therefore, was practically voided and fighting for Abyei remains a real threat.

The economic importance of Abyei to both sides is very potent thereby making the area the hot spot for the disparity between Sudan and South Sudan currently. However, based on the decision of the PCA, most oil fields were labeled outside Abyei and hence, the main sources of contention has been lessened. In this regard, Greenidge (2011) stated that the historical and political importance of Abyei still outweigh its economic or strategic value. The SPLM and the people of South Sudan considered Abyei as an area that was wrongly taken from the south on the basis of an agreement with a local chief before Sudan's independence (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011). The permanent settlers of Abyei, the Ngok-Dinka, also served as the political wing for SPLM in its struggle against the power elite in the North (Greenidge, 2011). Hence, the government of South Sudan strengthened their claim over Abyei assuring the Dinka that the land of Abyei belongs to them. Similarly, the government of Sudan seems unwilling to lose Abyei because it was part and parcel of Sudan since 1905 (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). Besides, the government of Sudan maintains that the Misseriya will turn against Sudan when are they excluded from participating in the Abyei issue (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011). The Misseriya groups are the pro-Sudanese forces who sacrificed a lot during the two civil wars. Hence, for Sudan, Abyei is an area that must be secured at all cost and compromise on Abyei is thus unthinkable (Greenidge, 2011).

With the ambition of securing Abyei, both sides turned into protracted disagreement on the eligibility of voters

who would participate in the Abyei Referendum. The South claimed that only the permanently settled populations should participate in the Referendum while the North proposed the inclusion of the Misseriya as voters in the Abyei Referendum (Greenidge, 2011). The government of Sudan demanded the Misseriya tribes to take part in the Referendum in order to outweigh the numerically small Ngok-Dinka and put Abyei under its control (Ibid). Due to the absence of progress in moderating positions, the issue of Abyei became a delicate issue during various high-level meetings and the Referendum to be conducted following South Sudan's Referendum is not yet finalized (Sandrai, 2013) as a result.

The two-year Ethio-Eritrean war and the post-war stalemate highly revolved around a small territory-Badme. As Berouk (2014) aptly noted, though Badme is not resourceful as Abyei, it remains a "flashpoint and a curse" in enhancing the Ethio-Eritrean post-war disparity. The two governments entered into a bloody fight so as to secure Badme the ownership of which is the sticking point on the demarcation process. The two sides feared public criticism and the prospect of political crisis once compromise is done on Badme. Badme, therefore, is a highly politicized spot which is compounded with deeper passion, animosity and misgivings that can complicate the future engagement between the two countries. Similarly, Abyei is a highly politicized territory with greater potential to fuel conflict and entrench stalemate between the two Sudans.

In the bid to make the Misseriya the permanent residents of Abyei, the Sudanese government is in favor of the Abyei stalemate (Rendón and Hsiao, 2013). The uncompromising stance of the two countries on the implementation of the Abyei Protocol, on the other hand, is capable of pushing the two sides into full-scale bloodshed. The issue can trigger another intractable conflict between Sudan and South Sudan (Debay, 2012; Akol, 2013; Winter and Prendergast, 2008). Besides, the implementation of other outstanding arrangements incorporated under the CPA or other interstate concords signed between the two countries can be dragged once the Abyei issue remains stalled for unlimited period of time (Jensen and Fick, 2009; Debay, 2012). The two governments are thus required to soften their positions regarding Abyei and operationalize the Protocol to end the Abyei deadlock.

Furthermore, the dispute over Abyei is not limited to interstate conflict but also involves the Ngok-Dinka and the Misseriya groups as well. The relations between these two groups deteriorated for the last few decades and series of disputes between them provoked following the independence of South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 13 April 2014). The cost of the Abyei stalemate is pivotal in fueling and deteriorating the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka relations including groups who have a historical right on

land and other sources in Abyei. In this vein, the October 2013 unilateral referendum held by the Ngok-Dinka communities depicts the growing grievance on the flawed nature of the Protocol itself (Arrno, 2012). As Omer Salih Abubakr (2014) stated, the two ethnic groups are agro-pastoralists that rely on the pasture and water resources of Abyei and their fights emanate from using such resources. The two governments can mitigate the clash between these two groups through changing their life style and improving livelihood.

Political elites from both Sudan and South Sudan used tribalism very seriously. Unless the status of Abyei is determined, the Sudan-South Sudan proxy engagement in crisis regarding Abyei is inevitable. In this regard, since the signing of the CPA, the government of Sudan encouraged different armed groups to displace the sedentary Ngok-Dinka southward (Johnson, 2011; Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). The Sudanese government still supports and collaborates with armed members of the Misseriya tribes and armed groups to forcefully seize Abyei as well as expel the Ngok-Dinka from the area (Sudan Tribune, 17 March 2014, 13 April 2014). The continued attacks organized by the government of Sudan further undermined the longstanding co-existence of the Ngok-Dinka and Misseriya. In the same manner, Omer Salih Abubakr(2014) and Berouk (2014) strongly argued that the use of ethnic clashes as a means of realizing sectarian ends should cease if peace is to prevail in Sudan-South Sudan relations. Instead of engaging in proxy wars, governments of the two countries require to maintain good relations with important constituencies in Abyei and facilitate independent dialogue between the Ngok-Dinka and the Misseriya to strengthen and build confidence.

The Issue of Citizenship

The other major debacle that adversely impacts on the relations between Sudan and South Sudan is the issue of citizenship/nationality. Controversies between the two governments surfaced with respect to the determination of the status of southerners living in North and northerners in the South. The government of South Sudan advocated for the establishment of dual citizenship in that southerners living in the North and northerners in the South should be allowed to possess citizenship of both countries (Manby, 2012; Musso, 2011; Sikainga, 2011). Accordingly, the 2011 Nationality Act of South Sudan allows dual nationality to South Sudanese irrespective of the place where they live (Manby, 2012). Contrary to the demand of its South Sudanese counterparts, a month later, the government of Sudan amended the old nationality law that automatically abrogated the nationality of South Sudanese living in

Sudan (Manby, 2012; Musso, 2011; Sikainga, 2011). This position of the Sudanese government was also hinted during the interim period in that the government made clear that citizenship to South Sudanese living in Sudan would not be granted once the South secedes (Sikainga, 2011; Debay, 2012). Hence, over 350,000 South Sudanese have already been deported from Sudan since November 2010 while more than half million still remain in Sudan (Manby, 2012; Kimenyi, 2012).

Though the governments of the two countries initiated the "Four Freedoms Agreement", gives the citizens of both countries the freedom of residence, movement as well as the freedom to dispose property and undertake economic activities in either country, in March 2012, implementation of the deal was stalled and the government of Sudan ordered the South Sudanese to leave the country by April 2012 (Kimenyi, 2012). Southerners residing in Sudan have been dismissed from their work and children have been deprived to enroll in schools and to get health care services as a result of which thousands of Southerners, notably the university students, government officials, private and public workers, etc, returned to South Sudan (Manby, 2012). As a counter measures, the government of South Sudan also issued a press release announcing that Sudanese citizens should hold valid visas to enter the South (Ibid).

After a period of deadlock, Sudan and South Sudan signed another agreement on the status and treatments of nationals of each other and related matters. This agreement resembles the March 2012 "Four Freedoms Agreement". According to this Agreement, the two states affirmed the establishment of a Joint High Level Committee to oversee the adoption and implementation of joint measures as regards the status and treatment of nationals of each state in the territory of the other. Parties to the treaty agreed to allow nationals of both countries the freedom to reside, move, acquire and dispose of property, and undertake economic activities in both States. This agreement was intended to bolster positive interactions among peoples and build socio-cultural and economic ties that will enhance relations between the two States.

Since the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean war, governments of the two countries arbitrarily expelled the citizens of each other living in their respective territories. Though the Ethiopian government allowed Eritreans to live inside Ethiopia, it had forcefully expelled around 75,000 Eritreans from Ethiopia following the escalation of the war (Human Rights Watch, 2003). The documents proving Ethiopian nationality of people of Eritrean descent were confiscated, property rights were cancelled and travel papers in many instances were marked "Expelled—Never to Return"(Ibid: 3). Deportation of Ethiopians from Eritrea already started in 1991, which led to the expulsion of 50,000 people without taking any of their possessions with them (Abbink, 1998). Detention

and expulsion of Ethiopians from Eritrea also continued with great vigor following the outbreak of the war in 1998 (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Such arbitrary, forceful and abusive expulsion of citizens raised mutual suspicion and deepened antipathy and hatred among peoples of the two countries (Abbink, 1998, 2003a).

As discussed above, millions of South Sudanese are currently living in the territory of Sudan and most of them want to establish their domicile there forever (Manby, 2012). They have no desire to return to South Sudan. As the Ethio-Eritrean experience further entails, the consequence of forceful and abusive deportations of nationals of one another is most threatening to interstate relations and people to people cordiality and trust as well. Sudan and South Sudan are thus required to end the forceful expulsion of nationals living in each other's territory. Instead, the two countries expected to undertake joint actions to keep the safety and welfare of all the Sudanese and South Sudanese. In this regard, a strong arrangement that pave the way for the peaceful repatriation (if mandatory) of each other citizens with their possession is needed.

The other option is to allow citizens the freedom to choose their places of domicile. In this regard, Debay (2012) strongly argues that, though maintenance of dual citizenship is quite challenging, allowing nationals of both countries to choose their domicile in either part would have greater importance to end the question of nationality. Taking into account the tragedies observed in Ethio-Eritrean relations, Esayas and Berouk also argued that, instead of engaging intensively to deport citizens of each other, promoting conditions that facilitate cross-border trade, cultural exchanges and other mutually beneficial activities can have significant impetus in the process of normalizing relations and building confidence between the two Sudans. Forming integrated economic activities and socio-cultural intermarriages can have the potential to cool down the deep-rooted antipathy and mistrust that the peoples of the two countries harbored so far (Kimenyi, 2012; Widdatallah, 2012).

Resource Utilization

The secession of South Sudan is quite worrying to Sudan as 75% of oil production originates in the South (Lunn and Thompson, 2012; Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012) and hence the loss of much of the oil reserves resulted in a significant loss of the revenue (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). As a result of the reduction of the revenues from oil, the government of Sudan demanded the South to pay \$32 per barrel for oil shipments through the pipeline to Port Sudan (Ibid). Contrary to the proposal of the Sudanese government, the regime in South Sudan wanted to pay transit fee based on the international norm

of \$1 per barrel (Ibid). As a result of the absence of a mutually acceptable transit fee and the rumors that the Republic of Sudan was stealing South Sudan's oil, the government of South Sudan shutdown all oil production on January 2012 and refused to use the pipelines and port facilities that are owned by Sudan (Kimenyi, 2012; Lunn and Thompson, 2012).

The impasse created during the shutdown of oil production schemes endangered the revenues of both countries. The revenues earned from oil production declined thereby forcing the two countries to introduce budget austerity (Sandrai, 2013; Rolandsen, *et al.*, 2012). Besides, the two countries were obliged to cut billions of *pounds* from their budget to agriculture, education as well as health care services (Kimenyi, 2012). Closing of oil productions thus means taking a suicidal path since oil is the principal sources of revenue for both countries. The closing of oil production also augmented inflation and depletion of oil reserves (Kimenyi, 2012; Sandrai, 2013). After months of deadlock, Sudan and South Sudan reached an agreement in September 2012 as a result of which South Sudan agreed to pay 1.60 US\$ per barrel to Sudan for oil processing services and 8.40 US\$ per barrel for transportation services.

Subsequently, the recent deadlock between Ethiopia and Eritrea seems to have prompted Sudan and South Sudan to deal with the impasse once and for all. Though varying in degree, the virtual breakdown of their relations and the cost of the post-war disparity are too devastating to the economy of both Ethiopia and Eritrea (Plaut, 2005/2006; Kidist, 2011; Trivelli, 1998). As a result of the prolongation of the stalemate and the hostility with Ethiopia, the Eritrean government is exposed to different economic mishaps. The stalemate forced Eritrea to abandon its economic role as the external trading partner for the Ethiopian hinterlands (Healy, 2007). The revenues earned from port services come to an end since Ethiopia turned to use the Port of Djibouti rather than Assab and Massawa (Plaut, 2005/2006). Eritrea lost hundreds of million dollars that it used to earn from port services. The consequences of the disparity also forced the Ethiopian government to lose the age-old and convenient nearby sea outlets and pay an increased fee for port service to Djibouti (Robera, 2011).

Though South Sudan possessed huge oil resources, the available pipelines, refineries and port facilities to prepare and ship its oil to the international market belongs to the Republic of Sudan (Kimenyi, 2012). The oil is shipped via Port of Sudan and the refineries are located in Sudan. In the long run, South Sudan can build its own pipeline through other routes. However, the current capacity of the country to build different pipelines and other infrastructural services, which are important to access the global markets, is quite challenging and too expensive (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). Therefore, South Sudan must strike an acceptable deal to have

access to the service of the oil infrastructures and refineries owned by the Sudan until it constructs its own. The benefit of cooperation between the two countries is imperative to the Republic of Sudan as well. Sudan can generate incomes from transportation fees levied on oil piped from the South to the coast, rent from port, as well as charges from the processing of South Sudanese oil.

The forgoing discussion thus indicates that the two Sudans can benefit mutually from forming cordial relations. Cooperation enables peoples of the two countries to access goods and services easily from either part. Sudanese and South Sudanese cooperation also enables both to offset unnecessary defense costs. Taking into account the conflict-ridden fragility of the region, Esayas (2014 and Abebe (2014) argued that the cooperation and cordiality between the two Sudans not only maximize the interests of the two parties but the spillover effect of their cordiality would have tremendous impact on the stability of the region at large. To be better off and mutually benefit from such economic engagement, the two countries need to institutionalize their relations and calm down aggression towards each other (Musso, 2011). The establishment of strong institutions enables both countries to outwrought greed and curtail aggression through making a level field suitable to channel dialogue for any divergence that unfolds.

Transition to Democracy

As one closely looks at the current situation, transition to democracy in Sudan and South Sudan is minimal or even non-existent. The political environment prevailing in both countries is inimical to the existence of pluralistic political process, where press freedom was guaranteed, dissents are heard, civil societies are allowed to operationalize, and the rights of political parties are respected.

A press release by the Human Rights Watch (2012) conveys that the government of Sudan has stepped up censorship of the print media. The newspapers are subjected to various methods of censorship and punitive measures have been taken for publishing articles on sensitive issues (Ibid). Harassing journalists and political parties spread in the wake of the recent fighting with South Sudan as well (Ibid). The government arbitrarily shutdown several civil society organizations and other liberal forums, which are working for the promotion of multiculturalism, democracy and human rights in the country (African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, 2013). Since the deterioration of the bilateral relations and the outbreak of the war with South Sudan, the Sudanese government banned the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) as a political party and many of its members were subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention for which the National Intelligence

and Security Services are largely responsible (Ibid). The space for dialogue and negotiation on human rights and other critical issues to determine the future of the country has severely shrunk. The scale of violence unleashed by the government drastically increased in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur areas thereby leading to the proliferation of different insurgent groups.

Contrary to the promotion of diversity, tolerance and pluralism, the government also seems to be inclined to impose a singular Arab- Islamic identity throughout the country (Sikainga, 2011). Once the South secedes, the President promised to turn Sudan into an Islamic state where "Sharia and Islam will be the main source of the Constitution by declaring Islam, the official religion, and Arabic the official language" (Kron, 2010). As the President made clear in his speech, the place for cultural diversity will come to an end in Sudan (Ibid). Analysts, on their part, strongly criticized such trends taking into account the diverse nature of Sudan's population and its impact in fuelling conflict in the country. The oversimplified ambition of creating an Islamic state can intricate grievances among many communities thereby leading to the proliferation of rebels and insurgent movements (Hsiao and Jones, 2011; Sikainga, 2011). According to Hsiao and Jones (2011), the prevalence of instability and unrest in the country provides an incentive for external powers including South Sudan to engage in the pursuit of self-interest. Thus, the project of Islamizing the country through negating diversity needs to be challenged.

Like in Sudan, the political transition of South Sudan did not witness remarkable progress. The government that holds power developed a "winner-takes-all" mentality (ICG, 2011) as a result of which around 97 percent of the seats in parliament was seized by the SPLM and affiliates (Thomson, 2013). State authority is excessively centralized in the hands of the executive branch of the government and decisions are often made unintelligibly without consultation or oversight (Knopf, 2013). The constitutional making process was conducted excluding the wider population and the Constitutional Review Commission was dominated by the ruling party (Jok, 2013). Building a participatory civilian party structure with authentic grass-root mobilization and organization across communities and identity groups becomes an illusion (Knopf, 2013). The concept of political opposition appears to be missing and opposition political parties are regularly intimidated and harassed by SPLM-affiliated security agents (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). The government was too suspicious and defensive in its engagement with civil society and the creation of a favorable environment for the operation of different civil societies thus shrinks down (Knopf, 2013). Informing the public on the progress of Sudan-South Sudan negotiations is uncommon (Jok, 2013) and public opinion was disregarded as well as media independence and autonomy was curtailed (Knopf,

2013). Even within the internal political structures of the SPLM, debates are not encouraged, dissents are not voiced, and participatory decision making remains farfetched (Ibid).

The regular removal of different officials from office characterized the political environs of South Sudan too (Ibid), which can lead to the segmentation of elite. The President removed officials and replaced them by his preferences and most cabinet ministers are constituted of the Dinka Rek clan at present (Sarwar, 2013). The government is repeatedly accused of discriminatory attitude towards other ethnic groups and failures in ensuring equal representation for all ethnic groups in the government structures (Ibid). The December 2013 South Sudanese crisis partly indicates the inequitable and the non-inclusiveness of ethnic groups in the government structure and the regular removal of officials from their positions. The point to be drawn thereof by South Sudan here is that the unequal representation and excessive centralization of power is pivotal in fueling disparities, which create a breeding ground for protests and intervention of other actors. The prevalence of intractable instability further provides an incentive for external power interventions for the sake of advancing power base or destabilization agenda. Besides, the consequent internal regime insecurity in South Sudan can affect North-South normalization process.

The political environs created after Ethiopia and Eritrea separated partly is indicative of less transition to democracy and open public debates. Secrecy and hostility to open public debate characterizes the political space available in the two countries (Trivelli, 1998). Lack of accountability and public debates not only shadowed the bilateral relations but also blurred the resolutions of the conflict itself (Dima, 2006). Suppression of the media and different civil-political groups characterized the political features of the two countries. As a result of the unfolding authoritarianism in both countries, the issue of normalization of the Ethio-Eritrean relations is subjected to the will of elites only thereby perpetuating the prevailing no-war no-peace situation.

Hence, the point to be drawn thereof by Sudan and South Sudan is to curtail authoritarianism and unaccountable administration. Transition to democratic systems of governance can have the potential to maintain internal stability thereby widening opportunities to Sudan and South Sudan to get more time for the resolution of unresolved issues. Besides, elite's propensity to war can be calmed down once the two countries established a well institutionalized democratic system. According to Rolandsen, *et al.* (2012), resolution of the Sudan and South Sudan conflict could not be addressed by the leadership of the two countries alone but requires more parties to take part in dialog around the negotiating table. It should not be limited to elites only but the chance for different civil-political or other groups including common

peoples of both countries to take part in the normalizations process must be enlarged. Berouk (2014) also further stated that these sections of the society can contribute a lot in the resolution of the Sudan-South Sudan conflict through devising alternative solutions, ensuring accountability, building confidence, as well as lobbying. Therefore, the predatory political structures of both countries that suppress dissent, political pluralism, civil society organizations and the autonomy of the media need to be transformed into an all-inclusive and accountable dispensation.

Cessation of Destabilization

Ongoing development nowadays shows that Sudan and South Sudan are replete with and threatened by domestic military and political oppositions. In Sudan, for instance, ongoing crisis is witnessed in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur areas resulting from political and socio-economic marginalization perpetrated by the central government of Sudan (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011). Since the separation of South Sudan and the deterioration of their relations, Sudan and South Sudan accused each other of participating in destabilizing one another. In this regard, Omer Salih Abubekr (2014) acknowledged the inevitability of accusation as far as conflict of interests is concerned.

The continuation of instability and conflict in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur regions provide a perceived mechanism to South Sudanese design to destabilize the regime in Sudan through supporting different insurgents. Accordingly, the Sudan government repeatedly accused South Sudan of extending assistance to the rebels in those areas (Christian, 2012). The government expressed the allegation to the Security Council noting that South Sudan is supporting rebels that operate in Sudan. The message expressed that the government of South Sudan assisted rebels in Sudan with finance, logistics and material. Though the government of South Sudan denied lending support to the insurgents of Sudan, the reality on the ground revealed that it is supporting the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N) and the rebels in Darfur (Christian, 2012; Hsiao, 2012; Widdatallah, 2012). The military and logistical cooperation between SPLA and SPLM-N are still powerful despite their official split since July 2011 (Christian, 2012; Rolandsen *et al.*, 2012; Hsiao, 2012).

Similar with its Sudanese counterparts, South Sudan also faced a growing numbers of armed conflicts both within and beyond its border since independence. Well armed insurgents and military groups existed in Unity and Jonglei states (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011). The government of South Sudan did not hesitate to blame the Sudanese government for exacerbating the crisis in these

areas. The government alleged that the government of Sudan is supporting the armed militias and rebels in Unity state and Jonglei (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011; Hsiao, 2012; Widdatallah, 2012). The regime in Sudan poured arms and other logistical support to the Nuer militia, also called the South Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army in Unity state and to South Sudan Democratic Movement/ Army in Jonglei and Upper Nile states (Small Arms Survey, 2012; Hsiao, 2012;). Recently, South Sudan also blamed Sudan for providing support to the rebels led by Riek Machar who fights the central government (Sudan Tribune, 9 April 2014). Hence, through supporting rebels, Sudan and South Sudan de-legitimize and destabilize each other.

Although there appears to be less direct confrontations, the Ethio-Eritrean engagement to destabilize each other through supporting different dissident groups has been witnessed over the last few years. Arming internal oppositions and other proxy forces characterized the post-war relations between the two countries. While the Ethiopian government backed the Transitional Government of Somalia to fight different insurgents and terrorist groups destabilizing the region, Eritrea assisted and sided with the Somali insurgent forces such as al-Shabab and Hozbul Islam as well (Kidist, 2011; Kidane, 2011). As Berouk and Esayas stated, the Ethio-Eritrean mutual destabilization and proxy engagement subsequently perpetuates the animosity and mistrust. Likewise, the post-secession destabilization in Sudan and South Sudan is quite worrying since it undermines the ongoing normalization process and fuels the already tense relations. Normalization of relations between the two becomes too difficult to achieve as long as both countries intervene in the affairs of each other. The involvements of the two governments in proxy arming of dissident groups can create an insecure environment and a new power centre that the two countries can no longer control. Sudan and South Sudan thus need to end mutual intervention and de-legitimization of each other's sovereignty so as to make their future bright.

Cessation of Militarism

Around the end of the First Civil War in Sudan, oil was discovered in different parts of the country. As a result of the outbreak of the Second Civil War, effective utilization of such precious resources was not observed so far. Since the beginning of the 21st century, however, government revenues from oil substantially increased that allowed securing sophisticated weaponry. The use of force and violence to secure territorial or resource claims dates back to the independence of the Republic of Sudan from Anglo-Egyptian rule. For instance, since the discovery of oil in South Sudan in the late 1970s, the government of Sudan attempted to forcefully redraw the

boundaries and carve the oil abundant region out of the southern territory (Indris, 2005; Girma, 1997). The post-CPA period also shows that the ethos of using force as an instrument for maximizing the interests of the regime is powerful. The crisis in Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions best manifest the regimes tendency of using military invincibility to suppress dissents. Instead of solving the crisis in these areas diplomatically, the regime in Sudan waged war and used force.

The government that was established in South Sudan during the interim period also spent significant amount of its budget for the security sector. Preoccupied with the issue of maintaining national security and implementation of the CPA, the SPLA purchased different armaments with the intention of empowering its military strength (Small Arms Survey, 2012). The expenditure allocated to the security forces exceeds the budget allocated for education and health care services by four and five time respectively (Mutiga, 2011). The SPLA, the national army of South Sudan, consists of around 210,000 personnel (Small Arms Survey, 2012) as a result of which South Sudan currently is one of the heavily militarized states in the Horn (Mutiga, 2011). Though the government promised to disarm and demobilize its force until 2017, the ongoing reality reveals that SPLA continues importing sophisticated weapons to upgrade its capabilities (Small Arms Survey, 2012).

According to Abebe (2014), the major factor that severely contracted interstate relations and the stability of the Horn of Africa is the longstanding tradition of using force, military, as the means to realize national interest or self egos. Since the formal split, deemed by their military might, Sudan and South Sudan turned into direct confrontations over the control of most congested areas. The military engagement of Sudan and South Sudan in Abyei and other disputed areas has been occurred (Debay, 2012; Hsiao, 2012). Both used the militias and other spoilers in an effort to influence the political situation of one another (Ibid). They deployed their armies that stand in close proximity along the North-South border. According to the Satellite Sentinel Project 2013 Report, the September 2012 Agreement required for the demilitarization of forces from shared and contested borders. However, the two countries violated the agreement through positioning their forces within the agreed-upon demilitarized buffer zone (Ibid). The use of force as an instrument to realize self-egos undermines not only the bilateral relations between the two countries but the stability of the region at large.

In this regard, the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience must remind Sudan and South Sudan to terminate militarism so as to harmonize their relations. The use of might as a principal means to dominate neighbouring countries characterized the post-secession political disposition of the Eritrean government. The leadership of Eritrea upheld and prioritized the view that

military invincibility as a means of its state building and hegemonic project (Gebru, 2006). It is this tenacity that severed Eritrea's relations with neighbouring countries including Ethiopia. The longstanding history of Sudan and South Sudan also dictates recognition that the use of physical force did not fulfill any of the "Arabization and Islamization" projects of various elite groups after the end of Anglo-Egyptian rule.

Sudan and South Sudan hence require prioritizing negotiation and dialogue as the viable mean to effectively address and deal with their various differences than embarking on mobilization or militarization of forces. Instead of using coercive means to realize self interests, the two countries are expected to adopt negotiation and other amicable dispute resolutions mechanisms. According to Omer Salih Abubakr, all the issues on which Sudan and South Sudan contested can be solved only through political dialogue or round-table discussions than military means. Omer Salih Abubakr further added that the use of force could not be a viable option to harmonize their relations and differences. In the words of Hsiao (2012) and Musso (2011) too, negotiations remain the best means for the two parties to settle their differences. The culture of militarism that arduously harmed millions of their ancestors during the First and Second Civil Wars thus need to be repudiate unconditionally.

The Issue of "Good Faith"

Last but not least, Sudan and South Sudan should build good faith and trust in implementing the different bilateral agreements accordingly. After months of bloodshed and tensions, Sudan and South Sudan concluded different agreements in September 2012 regarding border issues, security arrangements, treatment of nationals of each other, port-service benefits, oil, trade and other economic matters. These agreements raised the expectation that South Sudan and Sudan were on the path to peace (Ismail and Kumar, 2013).

All the agreements signed between the two parties were meant to be implemented in a coordinated and simultaneous fashion by both parties. However, six months later, none of these happened (Ismail and Kumar, 2013; Akol, 2013). In this regard, as Ismail and Kumar (2013) stated, the government of Sudan is less cooperative and uncommitted to put the agreements into effect thereby putting the maintenance of peace questionable. The government of Sudan presented various preconditions regarding the implementation of the September 2012 agreements (Ismail and Kumar, 2013). The alleged participation of South Sudan on the side of different rebel groups of Sudan complicated the situation in this regard (Akol, 2013). The relative intransigency of the Sudanese government on the implementation of the mutual concords was also witnessed even during the

interim period (Ismail and Kumar, 2013). The uncooperative stances of the Sudanese government on the implementation of various agreements further perpetuated the suspicions on the part of South Sudan officials (Hsiao, 2012). Officials from South Sudan maintained that the regime in Sudan has strong intention of destabilizing the South (Ibid).

According to Berouk, the cultures of abiding to certain concords and the belief in negotiations and dialogue were unlikely when one looks at the political environs of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Though Ethiopia and Eritrea concluded several protocols before the opening of the hostility, the implementations of the accords in good faith was not that much encouraging or even non-existent. Esayas attributes the unimplemented nature of the various accords to the failure of the Eritrean government and thus considered the leadership of Eritrea as "rogue" whereby the habit of respecting international law and other inter-state agreements became futile. The unfolding of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrea war also resulted from the lack of implementation of the various agreements including the Algiers Agreement too. The two countries agreed to solve their border problems through International Court of Arbitration given that the decision of the EEBC remained on paper. Normalization of the Ethio-Eritrean relations was thus stalled not only because of the unresolved nature of border issues or the act of destabilization but also the inability to put the agreement into effect on the part of both.

Therefore, the Ethio-Eritrean experience should serve as a lesson for Sudan and South Sudan to be committed and willing enough to operationalize the mutual understandings fully. Various incompatibilities between the two countries are solvable if the two sides cooperate and commit to put all the accords into effect. Any sort of delay and indifference on the implementation of agreements concluded so far can complicate the normalizations process. Resolution of conflicts can be hindered and maintenance of durable peace between the two countries becomes a mirage when the conflicting parties lack genuine commitment to carry out the terms of the agreements reached.

CONCLUSION

Despite the formal split, the Sudan-South Sudan relations in the post-secession periods remains tense and the two countries entered into protracted disagreements over border, Abyei and citizenship issues including the financial arrangements particularly those pertaining to the revenues from the sale of South Sudanese oil that transit through Sudan for export. Hence, in this paper, attempt has been made to shed light on how the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience provides lessons for Sudan and South Sudan in the process of normalization of their

relations.

The border between Ethiopia and Eritrea remained un-demarcated at the time of the independence of the latter. The cost of the un-demarcated border between the two countries later forced them to pay heavy costs and the post-war strained relations were also intertwined with border issues. Similarly, the border between Sudan and South Sudan is still not demarcated and the two countries contested over a range of territories. Border areas of the two Sudans are rich in oil and other resources and hence the presence of porous boundary between the two countries is quite challenging. It widens opportunities for the two countries to forcefully grab fields that do not officially belong to them thereby leading to intractable disputes. Considering the consequence of the un-demarcated borders and based on the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience, Sudan and South Sudan should undertake swift actions to end the border deadlocks. In this regard, the issue of political will and commitment through entering into negotiations and compromise is decisive for Sudan and South Sudan to solve impending border problems and normalize their relations. It should be recalled that the intransigency and the uncompromising stances of the two governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea culminated in the border discord and normalization of their relations became an illusion. The Ethio-Eritrean experience further implies that involving and ascertaining the ideas of local peoples living in the disputed territories is crucial to solve border disputes since local communities can play a lot in the process of carrying out various deals with regard to border issues. Besides, through involving local peoples living on both sides of the borders the two Sudans can overcome the unnecessary division of homesteads and socio-cultural and economic sites.

Similar measures have to be taken so as to bring an end the Abyei dispute, which is a flash point that arduously impacts the Sudan- South Sudan relations. Abyei is nowadays a highly politicized spot with the potential to fuel conflict and entrench stalemate between the two Sudans. The two countries entered into an open conventional war over Abyei since the independence of South Sudan. The military engagement of the two countries either in the form of proxy war or direct military moves are evidently observed until recently. Such kind of provocative stances can lead both countries into intractable conflict. It is such provocative moves that flared up around Badme that further diverted the Ethio-Eritrean cordiality into an open hostility. Governments of the two Sudans thus need to soften their position regarding Abyei and end their military engagement and implement the terms of the Abyei Protocol so as to end the deadlock.

The Ethio-Eritrean experience also revealed that the arbitrary, forceful and abusive expulsion of nationals of each other can raise mutual suspicion and deepen

antipathy in people-to-people and interstate relations. From the very beginning, the forceful and abusive expulsion of nationals is contrary to upholding the very fundamental rights of the peoples. The impact of forceful deportation of nationals can leave bad psychological perception particularly to those who are the victimized in the process. Sudan and South Sudan thus should consider ending the forceful expulsion of nationals living in each other's territory. Instead, the two countries are expected to undertake joint actions to keep the safety of each other's nationals and peacefully repatriate (if mandatory) them with their possession. Allowing peoples to choose their place of residence is also the other option to end the issue of citizenship.

The other point to be drawn thereof by Sudan and South Sudan is curtailing authoritarian and unaccountable sorts of rule. The rationale here is that the presence of authoritarianism produces grievance and instability thereby widening opportunities for the prevalence of mutual intervention through the extended support of each other's insurgent movements. The war-mongering stance of political elites can be controlled through developing a well-institutionalized democratic system. Besides, creation of an amicable political environment where civil societies, experts and coordinated and responsible opposition groups participate freely can provide the leverage to break the stalemate and normalize the relations between Sudan and South Sudan. These sections of the society can generate alternative solutions for the resolution of the conflict and normalization of the relations between the two Sudans. The predatory political structures of both countries that suppress dissent, political pluralism, civil society organizations and the media, therefore, need to be transformed in a comprehensive, accountable and transparent manner. It is due to the absence of well-institutionalized democratic systems of governance that the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession relations were bedeviled and the discrepancy persisted so far.

The relations between Sudan and South Sudan in the post-secession period were marked by mutual recriminations and destabilization. The two countries involved in destabilizing one another by extending support to rebels that operate in each other's territory. In this regard, the government of South Sudan backed the SPLM-N in the fight against the government of Sudan while the government of Sudan supported different insurgents in Unity state, Jonglei and Upper Nile areas. The consequence of mutual intervention is thus quite threatening to the peaceful co-existence of the two countries. The normalization of Sudan and South Sudan relations can be hindered as long as the two governments intervened in the affairs each other. Repudiation of mutual intervention is one of the important lessons that Sudan and South Sudan should draw from the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience.

The post-secession Sudan and South Sudan destabilization and proxy engagement marked the culture of recourse to conflict. The point here is that the belief in the use of force cannot solve any of the outstanding problems that the two countries face. The history of the two countries openly speaks that militarism did not solve the north-south longstanding issues rather than leading to the death of millions during the First and Second Civil Wars. Unless the two Sudans replace the culture of militarism by a new political and diplomatic proficiency, peace will not prevail and normalization of their relations will become a mere wish. The Ethio-Eritrean experience further strengthens this claim and the compelling lesson here is that recourse to arms could not be taken as an option to solve various contested issues.

The issue of good faith is the other important factor that Sudan and South Sudan should take into account. Various issues that Sudan and South Sudan contested on can be solved through putting all the agreements into effect. All the agreements signed between the two parties are meant to be implemented in a coordinated and simultaneous fashion by both parties. Commitment from both parties is needed to operationalize the agreements and maintain durable peace. Such kind of culture was largely absent as one looks at the political environs of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The unfolding of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war and the post-war stalemate partly resulted due to the failure to implement the bilateral agreements reached. Hence, implementing those agreements signed before and after the Referendum is the other compelling lesson to draw here for the two Sudans in the process of halting the prevailing stalemate.

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