

**Review**

# **FRENCH PHENOMENOLOGY: THE ROLE OF LEVINAS AND DERRIDA**

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The purpose behind this research paper is to give a brief design of the inception of Phenomenology and the part of Levinas and Derrida in the advancement of Phenomenology in France. The key part of the article incorporates into a prelude session where we recognize the wellsprings of Phenomenology to France. The scholar likewise characterizes the slow improvement in the field of phenomenology. The second stage includes the part of Levinas where the scientist utilizes a few appraisals to affirm the dynamic investment of Levinas and analyze the association in the middle of Husserlian and French Phenomenology. By distinguishing Derridean approach as a last stage in the improvement of French Phenomenology, the scholar will dispense with the suspicion that all Phenomenologies have the same attributes. This will consider more individual thought of French Phenomenologists instead of conventional German Phenomenologists. Moreover, this examination may facilitate future investigation researchers on the variables in French Phenomenology.

**Key Words:** Phenomenology, Philosophy, Critical theory, Levinas, Derrida.

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## **ORIGINS OF FRENCH PHENOMENOLOGY:**

Phenomenology is alive. It is restricted in which theory perpetually rehashes itself today, one way that it audaciously takes upon itself the assignment not to totally overlay upon itself inside of its own history, not to bashfully surrender the domains of truth, particularly that of discernment, to the sciences – whether they manage mankind or nature. Phenomenology is especially alive in France, in the French language, especially in French theoretical writings. On the off chance that one investigates "French Phenomenology," one could maybe recognize two "families." There is one group of the individuals who, taking after Merleau-Ponty, keep up substantial observation as the beginning opening for all things to show up. To follow how things show up, they

turn their consideration toward that which, in recognition, is before the complete and static thing in its eye to eye connection with a subject that is, itself, finished and static. The works of Henri Maldiney, Jacques Garelli, Marc Richir, and Renaud Barbaras, for instance – without attempting at all to "pack" all of them together – might be grouped, up to a specific point, in this gang. It is in this way an issue of returning to a pre-originary phase of experience, deadened by flimsiness and uncertainty since it confesses all division of decided characters – and that in light of the fact that the last is the spot where we get ourselves, the spot of consistent and ontological determination. At the end of the day, we should give something to do a decrease that is as of now inchoate or

inadequate. To reword Merleau-Ponty: a lessening that inclines toward that which, by definition, escapes adjustment initially; a diminishment that, in each occasion, requires by the same token its ceaseless restoration. Thusly this movement leads toward the mystery of the World: anonymity in case it goes toward that which goes before the subject that is changed in its character; the World, if the "World" is settled as the name of the previous horizon on which each one of that shows up can be showed up.

We can recognize another group of believed that branches off from the same phenomenological prerequisite that we come back to the occasion of appearance. This family, worried as it is with a lessening that looks to be significantly more radical, endeavors to turn its perspective to that which would be more originary than the World itself. One promptly sees the conundrum to which this phenomenology uncovered itself – whether it attests the oddity, or, in actuality, cases to preclude it. The very need of radicality, in its sympathy toward uncovering the way of showing up, leads phenomenology to what by and large introduces itself as the standard of appearance: the obvious, in its key structure. This phenomenology inclines toward that which comes to burst the unmistakable, that which comes to disturb it and does not permit itself to be caught by it. From whence comes, without uncertainty, the viciousness of its style, which can't be diminished to the roughness in the demonstration of composing, as exemplified not just by Levinas in *Otherwise Than Being, Or, Beyond Essence*, additionally by Michel Henry when it relates to depicting the structure of Immanence – Immanence that hides itself from the light of the World and whose development plays with tautology while never caving in into it. A traumatic – and damaging – method for vouching for the experience that comprises in presenting oneself to that which, more established than the obvious, overcomes and escapes it, however in the meantime excuses it – or possibly gives it importance. This phenomenological family imparts to the main family said, the Merleau-Pontian family, the sympathy toward releasing the subject as the post of activity and sway. Notwithstanding, in light of the fact that it looks to be much more radical, this study of the subject won't prompt an originary obscurity, but instead toward the aloofness more seasoned than all detachment of a named Self, evoked, definitely, as a sample of perseverance of the current test; a Self that, in one sense, comprises completely of the one demonstrated by this very experience.

One can't neglect to ponder, in light of this quickly outlined table of families, where is French phenomenology going? One might just resemble an awful student if one does not pose the question: How did Husserlian realism and the obligation of meticulousness that it always insisted, bring forth a logic that frets about that which goes before the determination of stable

characters, with that inchoateness which, by so doing, continuously escapes into the equivocally winding neither . . . nor in which the unmistakable is intertwined and to which painters give testimony well? Must not graceful recommendation come to supplant the thorough talk that tries to fittingly depict the request of characters? Silliness raises its head; be that as it may, one could well say, it could have been "more terrible." The most noticeably awful would be the second family evoked – which this section likes to look at.

Before diving more profound into this study, let us rapidly endeavor to present the most noteworthy agents – while understanding that such an unsafe activity risks satirizing each of the developments to some degree and obscuring what individuates them and makes them oppose simple order into a "family" (such order into "families" just reveals insight by briefly darkening the thing that is characterized).

### THE LEVINAS ENTRANCE

Levinas merits credit for having acquainted phenomenology with France. Most importantly else, he would not halt in stating himself to be a phenomenologist– meanwhile, be that as it may, inspiring the moral language, which phenomenology resorts so as to stamp its own intrusion. It is important to demand that Levinas, regularly associated with veering from phenomenological depiction for the sake of a theoretical development of the Other or of its commendation, has, for his own part, dependably asserted to rehearse phenomenological portrayal – particularly toward the start of his vocation, while never repudiating this case, regardless of the fact that it did muddle the significance of his work. Portrayal, it could be said, is really restored: it is not important to recognize and set up forces, but rather, despite what might be expected, to de-formalize, to surrender, through the demonstration of composing, the wonder to a dynamic indetermination of the skylines of sense. The inquiry will dependably stay, by the same token, of how to comprehend the phenomenological basic as the outlandish possibility of isolating the ideas from the exact samples by which they are set. In any case, we might now want to underline another part of the relationship that Levinas has with phenomenology. Depicting the path in which the substance of another shows up at the same time in forthrightness and in equivocalness, he demands the accompanying: the face darkens all force of constitution; it disturbs any foreordained skyline. The substance of another is constantly outside of any relevant connection to the issue at hand. Thus, it opens a measurement of hugeness: more plainly over Levinas' vocation, it is this moral measurement that would arrive at bless phenomenality with implication, with noteworthiness, as he put it. All

things considered, the amazing quality to the point of nonattendance that Levinas names the Infinite shows up however in its own particular incomprehensible way: in – or such as – the very interruption of phenomenality, as a hint of that which will have never been available. Nevertheless, the follow dependably holds to the skyline that it partitions and the disturbance of phenomenology is just permitted to occupy the same skyline that it upsets and opens to connotation: a radical interruption of phenomenology which is, by and by, just given as a follow or a reverberation of the very string that is dependably effectively bound to phenomenology.

### THE DERRIDEAN PRESENCE

The Derridean signal is, without a doubt, of each one of those displayed, the most reluctant to permit itself to be incorporated into a family by and large, and in this one specifically. Coincidentally, we will endeavor to appear in what ways it is not without authenticity that we welcome him to this family get-together. Derrida's association with phenomenology, from his most punctual writings – careful critiques on Husserl (see Derrida 1962, 1967) – was consistent, regardless of the possibility that he never acknowledged phenomenology all things considered. No ifs ands or buts, he profoundly deconstructed the power of vicinity that would have enlivened the developments of phenomenological decrease (eidetic and supernatural diminishment) – insofar as these would eventually lead back to the present-living of the cognizance. Be that as it may, deconstruction is never a nullification or a straightforward evaluate. In this way, from a specific perspective, Derrida could have declared the diminishment as an asset of deconstruction, since lessening dependably implies, in the work of Husserl, the gathering, without reservation or preference, of marvels – what Derrida would radicalize through introduction to the vastness of what might come: deconstruction itself. Of the considerable number of strings through which Derrida would never stop weaving the issues of phenomenology, here we will just specify two: the theme of the follow and the issue of the blessing. Alluding expressly to Levinas, the idea of the follow in Derrida ends up at the intersection of a reflection on the sign and a portrayal of phenomenality: the follow proclaims in the meantime, the originary tainting of the supernatural with the observational, and, in as much as it generally presupposes the theme of the archi-follow, that there is never full presence of wonders, that there are no such marvels and, in shutting, no phenomenology thusly. This last indicate loans itself the mystery of the same development: that the marvel will have dependably as of now been taken into the worldview of the phantom. This is in light of the fact that the unearthly affirms itself, unequivocally in Derridean works beginning in the 1990s,

as the perspective of all phenomenology: the apparition is neither the minimum presence nor a blend of vicinity and nonattendance that could be gotten a handle on as two self-sufficient terms, unadulterated from the source. In the same movement, the apparition is neither simply life nor absolutely passing, nor a blend of the two, yet originary survival, all life being survival from the beginning. Regardless of the possibility that one ought not unwisely drive the issue of the blessing onto that of gift in phenomenology, one will see that Derrida's depiction of the blessing – as a blessing, by definition, is never given without ailing in liberality – goes in this same bearing, making an emergency of phenomenology as a gathering free of bias, of a phenomenality that is offered without remainders: as indicated by Derrida, wonders are just given from an 'originary' absence, which would never permit itself to be caught as immaculate absence. Continuously as of now spectralized and beguiling, it makes an emergency in the spotless division in the middle of vicinity and nonattendance, in a tainting that does not permit it to be gotten from a gathered immaculateness, since this virtue is the thing that would have been the refinement and the former resistance of the two terms which is presence and absence. Phenomenology is, therefore, inconceivable in that capacity. In any case, this inconceivable possibility of upholding the phenomenological need and technique renders it similarly difficult to be totally and authoritatively confined. One can't get both the standards of phenomenology as showed by Derrida and guilelessness meanwhile – in any case, neither can one desert them.

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